The move toward a dynamical and embodied understanding of cognitive processes initiated a debate about the usefulness of the notion of representation for cognitive science. The debate started when some proponents of a dynamical and embodied approach argued that the use of representations could be discarded in many circumstances. This remained a minority view, however, and there is now a tendency to shove this critique of the usefulness of representations aside as a non-issue for a dynamical and situated approach to cognition. In opposition, I will argue that the representation issue is far from settled, and instead forms the kernel of an important conceptual shift between traditional cognitive science and a dynamical and embodied approach. This will be done by making explicit the key features of representation in traditional cognitive science and by arguing that the representation-like entities that come to the fore in a dynamical and embodied approach are significantly different from the traditional notion of representation. This difference warrants a change of terminology to signal an important change in meaning. 
. A criticism of the use of representations
cognitive apparatus can remain a lot simpler than was previously thought. For example, moving about The last few years, new themes are acknowledged in a city does not require an elaborate representation as important factors of cognition. Cognition is now of that city's lay out. It usually suffices that a increasingly seen as a phenomenon which is intrinsicognitive agent recognizes a limited number of cally embodied. Cognition is not restricted to hapdecision points where it has to take a specific turn. In penings within the head but involves also bodily and between, just following the street will lead it to a environmental happenings. Both the cognitive next decision point until a destination is reached. agent's body, as well as the environment in which Awareness that cognition is essentially embodied the agent operates, provides a lot of structure that the is connected with an appreciation of the central role cognitive agent's internal cognitive apparatus uses to played by the dynamical, time-dependent, relations solve the agent's problems. As a result, the internal involved in the interactions between a neural system, a body and an environment (Beer, 1995b ; Van agents are dynamical systems and, more specifically, processes, mainly those involving motor capacities. cognitive functioning has to be understood as a It may be that in some particular low-level cases the dynamical process for which the tools provided by use of representations can be disbanded. However, dynamical systems theory are best suited to make when it comes to real, higher-level, cognitive prosense of them (Van Gelder, 1995 , 1998 . This cesses-those involving thought, language and memperspective on cognition will here be called the ory-representations are essential. Dynamical and Embodied view on Cognition, or As a result of these often-repeated counterclaims, DEC for short.
there is a strong tendency to conclude that the critics At the onset of DEC, several authors downplayed of representation overstate their case. Cognitive the importance of the notion of representation for science cannot and should not do without representaexplaining cognition, and sometimes even hinted that tions. In this view, associating DEC with non-repreone could do fully without this notion (Beer, 1995b;  sentationalism merely detracts from the genuine Brooks, 1991; Kelso, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994;  contributions of DEC to cognitive science. These Van Gelder, 1995) . They presented case studies (e.g., genuine contributions do not contradict existing robots, developmental processes, and motor coordicognitive science ideas, but rather extend and supplenation) where the embodiedness and / or the dynamment those ideas. For example, Clark states that ''the ical characteristics of the agent could account for the real challenge lies not in the supposed implications observed behavior without invoking the notion of for notions of representation and computation but in representation. Most famous are probably Brooks' the ideas concerning the dense spatial and temporal insect robots of the late 1980s and early 1990s interplay between neural, bodily and environmental (Brooks, 1986 (Brooks, , 1999 . Compared to previous atfactors '' (1997b, p. 475) . Bechtel also argues that the tempts, these robots became better in dealing with a issue of representations does not set DEC apart from real world environment by skipping the idea that other views in cognitive science: DEC ''is not there must be some central representational mechachallenging the use of representations but is a nism.
collaborator in understanding the format of repreIf DEC does away with the need to invoke any sentations '' (1998, p. 305 ). use of representations in cognitive science, then it These authors subsequently conclude that DEC would be a sure sign of an enormous conceptual does not instigate an important conceptual change in change in cognitive science. Together with the cognitive science. Rather, DEC is acknowledged to notion of computation, no concept is more central to be an important addition to older insights, but it does existing cognitive science than representation. The not overthrow or severely criticize cognitive sciissue here is of course the 'if'. The examples ence's basic assumptions. Instead, DEC and compupresented by the authors mentioned above are impretational approaches are held to complement one ssive and, consequently, the strong no-representation another, without any antagonism between the two. In claim had a large impact. However, only a very this view, the proclamation that a dynamic and small minority became actually convinced that one embodied view on cognition inaugurates a major could do without representations in cognitive scireorientation in cognitive science is too strong. The ence. In contrast, there have been many attempts at suggestion, made by both Bechtel and Clark, is that rebutting the strong no-representation claim (Kirsh, it is time to disband the revolutionary talk and to 1991; Clark & Toribio, 1994; Clark, 1997a,b; Bech- separate the scientific DEC-wheat from the rhetorical tel, 1998). The counter arguments tend to converge DEC-chaff. on two main points. (a) The criticisms of representaIndeed, sober-mindedly separating wheat from tion focus on a much too narrow interpretation of chaff is an important task in any science at any time. representation, namely on representations as comHowever, I will argue that at least some of the plete world-models. Subsequently, it is argued that revolutionary talk is part of the scientific DECthe use of representations in cognitive science is not wheat. More specifically, I argue that DEC definitely restricted to this particular kind of representation. (b) involves an important conceptual switch with respect The critics of representation focus on lower-level to the notion of representation in cognitive science.
An all out DEC-view will still contain represenly used in a context involving agents. Agents, or tation-like entities. It will be possible to interpret persons, use symbols (words, pictures, signs, ciphers) those entities as representations. However, these to re-present things which are not immediately at representation-like entities have their origins in a hand. For example, I may use a sketch to represent very different conceptual background and they play a the layout of a city in order to help me going from different role compared to cognitive science's orplace A to B in that city. Thus representations add a dinary usage of representations. The changes are first-hand familiarity to cognitive explanations that important enough to warrant the claim that these make them insightful in an intuitive way. At the entities are not representations at all but entities that same time cognitive science is committed to derequire a different terminology.
veloping computational models capable of generating The remainder of this paper consists of the the phenomena of the mind, such as behavioral following sections. First I will discuss what kind of regularities. A distinction that is important here is representation cognitive science is committed to, and between personal and subpersonal levels of organizagive a short sketch of DEC in relation to representation. tions. In Section 4, I describe how self-organization Dennett introduced the term subpersonal into provides a general perspective of the dynamic and philosophy in 1969 when he made the distinction embodied view on cognition and how representationbetween ''the explanatory level of people and their like entities feature in this context. In Section 5, I
sensations and activities and the subpersonal level of argue that these entities are so different from the brains and events in the nervous system'' (quoted in traditional use of representation that they warrant the Hornsby, 2000, p. 7). Of course, there are many claim of being part of a non-representational acsubpersonal levels when it comes to happenings in count. the brain. One might look at the activity of individual neurons, small neural circuits or even more global brain processes. However, the point of using the label subpersonal is to remain close to a personal 2 . Traditional representation in traditional level of description. It is not meant to refer to brain cognitive science processes as brain processes. A subpersonal level of organization is that level (or those levels) of organiRepresentation is the central notion for traditional zation which provides the underlying mechanism for cognitive science. Representation is so central that personal level characteristics. It is the level which large parts of cognitive science only deal with describes brain (and bodily and environmental) representational issues while little interest is shown processes as the means by which personal level into the context where cognitive systems ultimately properties are generated. In this sense, the subpersonought to operate. DEC reacts to this negligence by al level is a core topic for psychological invesstressing the importance of the dynamic bodily and tigation. environmental context, and in this way draws attenThere is nothing new here, except maybe for the tion to the behavioral-the perception-action-conwording. Cognitive science and cognitive neurotext of cognition. The question of interest then science have never been understood as an invesbecomes what the notion of representation actually tigation of persons, but always as an investigation of contributes to cognitive explanations of the percepthe principles that enable us to be human. There is, tion-action couplings of a cognitive system. Addihowever, something which obscures the subpersonal tionally, it becomes possible to pinpoint in more focus of a large part of psychology. The intriguing detail which characteristics of representation are and often confusing move that is made within essential for performing this explanatory function.
traditional cognitive science is that the personal level What does representation contribute to the cognidescription that we use in our everyday explanations tive explanation of behavior? First it brings into play is used as the general blueprint for explanations at a our common sense, folk-psychological explanations subpersonal level of explanation. I call this use of for behavior. The notion of representation is normalpersonal-level representation-based explanations at a subpersonal level of behavioral explanation the Someone who deserves a lot of credit in coming Agent Theory, or AT for short (Keijzer, 2001) . up with the current-artificial intelligence and cogni-AT consists of the hypothesis that-when viewed tive science-way of dealing with this problem is at a general, behavior-related level of operation-a Kenneth Craik. Craik stated that one of the most brain (the agent's control structure) operates basicalfundamental properties of thought is its power to ly the same as a complete agent operates (as interpredict events (Craik, 1943, p. 50) . He mentioned preted in terms of folk psychology). This hypothesis three essential processes: involves the idea that the notion of representation, as used at a personal level, can also be used as a part of 1. 'translation' of external process into words, numa description of the functioning of the brain. So the bers or other symbols, first step in making cognitive science's use of 2. arrival of other symbols by a process of 'reasonrepresentations more explicit is by marking it as a ing', deduction, inference, etc., and form of subpersonal representation. This form of 3. 'retranslation' of these symbols into external representation may not derive its representationality, processes (as in building a bridge to design) or at its meaningfulness, from full-blown agents who use least recognition of the correspondence between something as a representation. Whereas, I may use these symbols and external event (as in realising pieces of string, syntactically structured symbol that a prediction is fulfilled) (ibid.). systems or whatever as representations, at a subpersonal level representation must be formulated in-
The process of reasoning produces a final result dependently of any such ascription. To use the similar to that which might have been reached by phrase in the philosophy of mind for this problem, causing the actual physical processes to occur: the meaning must be naturalized, and this has been a thought process mimics the external events and so core problem for many years that has still not been can be used to predict these external events (on the solved in a satisfactory way (Fodor, 1987; Cummins, condition that there is a time difference between the 1996). However, there is a way to come up with a two). Thus, according to Craik, the essence of fully subpersonal account of representation that can thought is that it provides a model of the external be used within cognitive science, even when it does world. not solve all the philosophical problems related with Craik postulated that the capacity of modeling is meaning. The important point to note here is that not restricted to minds: ''Surely, however, this subpersonal representation as used within cognitive process of prediction is not unique to minds, though science becomes dependent on this particular way of no doubt it is hard to imitate the flexibility and acquiring meaning. Subpersonal representation is not versatility of mental prediction.'' (p. 51). As examas selfevidently available for cognitive science as it ples he mentioned-it was 1943-a calculating is at a personal level where the presence of inmachine, an anti-aircraft predictor and Kelvin's tidal telligent agents can be assumed from the start.
predictor as mechanical parallels to the three stages The key to cognitive science's solution to the of thought. Johnson-Laird described a simple robot, problem of subpersonal representation is to think of made by Christopher Longuet-Higgins. In the abit as a form of internal modeling. This modeling idea sence of direct sensor information the robot's became to the fore when one tried to account for the havior was guided by a model. Johnson-Laird called fact that a lot of behavior is oriented toward the this a Craikian automaton. achievement of future goals and is relatively independent from the immediate sensory environment.
The robot moves freely on the surface of a table, Something else is necessary to explain how a but whenever it reaches an edge it rings an alarm cognitive system achieves its goals despite ambigubell to summon its human keeper to rescue it from ous and insufficient sensor-readings. (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 404) .
being an internal model of the external situation (Cummins, 1996; Keijzer, 2001) . Of course this does Of course, this sandpaper robot is extremely not preclude the possibility that a causal dependence simple. Still, it incorporates the three essential between X and A may occur-on the contrary, this is properties that Craik ascribed to thought: there is a what one expects when the model is adequatetranslation process from the world to an internal however, this is not sufficient for turning A into a representational medium, subsequently a process of representation. prediction takes place, and finally the result is Casting representation strictly as a model-based retranslated into the world where it modifies the phenomenon disqualifies many cases that we habitubehavior of the automaton in an adaptive way.
ally think of as representations from being actually The example illustrates how a mind-derived conrepresentational as far as the explanatory purposes of ceptual framework can be realized in a fully mecognitive science are concerned. It might be helpful chanical way and turned into a subpersonal theory of for us to view covarying internal states as representathe generation of behavior. The externally visible tions. However, this does not turn these states into behavior of a cognitive agent is thus explained by subpersonal representations for the so described postulating the existence of an internal model that is system, as long as they are not part of some internal isomorphic to the behaviorally relevant processes form of modeling. Any argument into the direction happening outside the organism (Rosen, 1979, of a non-representational approach in cognitive 1987). The model can subsequently act as a program science is thus not contradicted by the obvious fact that instructs the motor system so that specific, distal that there are many systematic relations between goals are achieved. This formulation is identical to specific environmental states and specific internal what Brooks terms the SMPA (sensing, modeling, cognitive states. Representation in cognitive science planning, and acting) framework (Brooks, 1999) , is a more specific and stronger claim than is often except that Craik's middle stage is here differentiated thought. into two separate stages. These components are
Another important point about the role played by thought to operate in a globally sequential way, one representations within AT is that they are conceived after the other, even when many local deviations of as the source of order that is present within the from strict sequentiality occur.
outward behavior of a cognitive system. The motor All this ought to be familiar. The reason for going system is traditionally seen as a peripheral part of the into this matter here is that it highlights the specific total cognitive system. In this view, the motor system contribution of the notion of representation to cogniis no more than an executive, a translating function or mechanism, passive in itself unless brought into was an initial claim that the ongoing organismplay to perform some planned action. The 'real' environment interaction is sufficient for almost all of action-that is deciding and planning what is to be human behavior. However, a strong argument against done-takes place within the cognitive system and this claim remains the observation that at least some leads to sequences of sets of instructions that enable aspects of human behavior require more long-term the motor system to turn these instructions into guidance than the short-term couplings between an actual movements. It is precisely this specific, pasagent and its immediate environment provide. In sive interpretation of the motor system that spawned particular anticipatory behavior, which consists of the dynamical and embodied approach.
achieving long-term goals, is insufficiently explained To summarize, I will take the two aspects of being in terms of immediate organism-environment intera form of internal modeling and being the source of action (Clark, 1997a) . Clark describes such behavior behavioral regularities as the defining conceptual as a representation-hungry problem. In this case, criteria of traditional representation in traditional behavior consists of regular sequences that are not cognitive science. When the notion of representation guided from moment to moment by the ongoing is criticized in the following it will be this particular organism-environment couplings. Thus, some form interpretation of representation.
of internal guidance remains necessary, in addition to such short-term coupling. At this point, there seems to be a strong reason for combining a DEC approach 3 . The organism-environment conceptualization with some form of representation. The notion of representation then helps to explain how short-term In contrast to AT's primary focus on the internal ongoing organism-environment couplings succeed in cognitive apparatus, a dynamical and embodied producing behavior that is oriented toward long-term approach proposes to explain intelligent behavior as goals even when the environment provides insuffia result of the fine-grained interactions between a cient guidance. neural system, the particular embodiment of an agent I will not go into the reasons for being dissatisfied and the characteristics of the environment. To exwith this so-called hybrid approach. A discussion of plain the occurrence of intelligent behavior one no such reasons can be found in (Keijzer, 2001) . As a longer postulates that everything of interest happens general observation, I just want to point out that a in an internal cognitive system which subsequently hybrid approach leaves the awkward personal-level imposes its plans on the body and consequently on origin of representation intact, while it remains the environment. The body and the environment are unclear to what extent representational motor instrucnow themselves seen as important players in an tions can hand over control to dynamical coupling. account of intelligence, rather than as the passive Leaving aside the issue whether model-based repreconveyers of decisions made by a central internal sentation, and a dynamical and embodied approach intelligence. As a result, the internal cognitive syscould make a good match, the point I want to make tem can be offloaded to a large extent as it does not in this paper is that it is not necessary to make this need to incorporate all intelligent characteristics step from representation-hungry problems to the beforehand. These intelligent characteristics arise as postulation of model-based internal representations, a result of concrete organism-environment interacas described in the previous section. A different kind tions.
of internal state will suffice. The general idea of a dynamical organism-environment coupling has been described many times (for introductions of the main ideas see, for example, 4 . Self-organization and 'representational Brooks, 1999; Clark, 1997a; Keijzer, 2001 ). The steering': the two-component view specific point of interest at present is the extent to which the neural system can be offloaded from its Casting intelligence, or at least intelligent berepresentational characteristics within this way of havior, as a phenomenon that arises out of a large conceptualizing intelligent systems. As said, there collection of small-scaled organism-environment interactions brings it into the domain of self-organithe biological case, which will be done in the zation. The notion of self-organization is a familiar remainder of this section. In the following section, I one nowadays. It has become common place that will turn to the issue how this way of steering bears certain kinds of physical, chemical and biological on the issue of representations in cognitive systems. systems have this self-ordering capacity in which a At first sight, invoking DNA as a steering factor in collection of initially disordered components become biological systems seems to contradict the impormutually coordinated and come to show patterns as a tance of self-organization there. Particularly in the collective. popular media, DNA is often staged as a complete It should be stressed at this point that the patternset of master instructions that specify the organizaformation exhibited by self-organizing systems is a tion of a living system (Keller, 2000) . The latter is general physical phenomenon. Haken (1987) , for then seen as a direct derivative of the instructions example, originally formulated his account of selfpresent in the DNA. In this image, DNA acts as a organization in the context of laser-light, while the controlling agent that actively forces an essentially development of convection rolls in a fluid heated passive and compliant medium (consisting of intrafrom below provides one of the standard cases to and extra-cellular processes) into specific patterns. introduce the idea of self-organization (Haken, 1995;  However, this general view of DNA as the sole Kelso, 1995). Self-organization then is a general origin of biological order is increasingly challenged phenomenon that is not necessarily related to bioby a view that stresses the additional importance of logical or psychological phenomena. The patterns self-organizing processes in biological systems generated simply follow general mathematical rules (Kauffman, 1993; Goodwin, 1994; Maynard Smith (Stewart, 1998 ). & Szathmary, 1999 Stewart, 1998 govern the behavior of matter (1998, p. 13). The general solution to the problem is to add an extra ingredient to the self-organizing process. This
Although there is definitely no agreement about ingredient consists of a factor that 'steers' the the relative importance of the two components-selfpattern-forming processes into specific directions. In organization and genetic instructions-it is now biology, DNA plausibly performs this role, while in increasingly clear that both are essential. Most psychology and cognitive science notions like interimportant for present purposes is the shift in interprenal representations and intentions come to mind.
tation this brings about when it comes to the Kelso calls this addition that makes biological and functioning of DNA in biological systems. cognitive self-organization different from self-or-
The notion of steering takes on a different meanganization in general ''the second cornerstone of ing when it involves a self-organizing process. biological self-organization' ' (1995, pp. 137-138) , Steering is not a matter of imposing order onto a self-organization itself being the first one. This system where there is no order to begin with. The 'second cornerstone' is most easily introduced for system that is being steered is not passive matter waiting to be molded into shape. On the contrary, the ''specific parametric influences'' at work (Kelso, steered medium provides itself the pattern forming 1995, p. 138). process. Steering is much less direct and rather takes Genes can then be interpreted as a set of control the form of modulating a set of ongoing processes.
parameters that are stored inside the biological When a system is in the position to develop into two system on a long-term basis. Genes provide the different directions at a certain moment, steering specific parametric influences that are required to consists of nothing more than to give a little push modulate self-organizing processes in such a way into one direction rather than another.
that they develop into the many different structures There are two concepts that are important to make and shapes of living systems. Following Meijer and this idea of steering a self-organizing process more Bongaardt (1996) (see also Keijzer, 2001 ), I will call concrete: the order parameter and the control paramsuch a control parameter an internal control parameeter. The order parameter represents the large-scale ter, or ICP for short. Thus, physical and biological (macroscopic) order brought about by the interacself-organization can be said to differ in the sense tions between a number of parts at a smaller that only biological systems manipulate their own (microscopic) scale (Haken, 1987) . In turn, the control parameters, and in this way the order parammacroscopic order parameter constrains or 'enslaves' eters that make up the large-scale structure of the behavior of the microscopic parts. Whether an biological systems.
order parameter arises or what form it takes depends
The link between genes and ICPs brings to the on the state of the system as described by a set of fore another aspect of ICPs before they can act as the parameters. Some of these parameters act as control steering factor of biological self-organization. These parameters. That is, by varying these parameters, the ICPs must themselves be steered by other factors. In system as a whole can be shifted from a disordered simple cases, an inactive ICP can be activated by state into an ordered state, or shifted from one some other external and essentially arbitrary paramemacroscopic pattern into another. Going back to the ter. For example, Meijer and Bongaardt (1996) use example of convection rolls above, changing the the effect of cornstarch on the viscosity of soup as an temperature difference between the bottom and top example of an internal control parameter. In this of the fluid layer is a way to shift the system from a example the temperature of the soup triggers the disordered macroscopic state into one which exhibits internal parametric influence of the cornstarch. When large-scale convection rolls (and back again). This the soup starts to boil, it becomes viscous. The makes the temperature difference a control parameter drawback of this setup for biological self-organizafor this particular form of self-organization. Mantion is that this process is still dependent on an ipulating the control parameter offers a way to unregulated external force; someone who wants to manipulate the order parameter. make soup, who puts in the cornstarch, and who In the general physical occurrence of self-organiturns on the fire beneath the pan. In biological zation, such as in the example of the fluid rolls, the systems the triggering of genes that could act as ICPs presence and the value of the order parameter is a is itself under the control of the living system. There matter of chance as far as the order-producing is a complicated loop-like system in which organismsystem is concerned. Whether or not someone puts al factors influence in many ways the transcription of on the fire beneath a pan filled with oil is not for the structural genes that actually code for specific prooil to decide. However, the situation is different in teins (Keller, 2000) . The whole takes the form of a biological forms of self-organization where the geso-called genetic regulatory network (Kauffman, netic factor comes into play. Using the language of 1993) consisting of widely dispersed and reciprocal order and control parameters, one can hold that a influences between genes, proteins and metabolic biological system is capable of manipulating its own processes. As Kauffman argues, such networks are control parameters, turning them on and off in order themselves to be interpreted as self-organizing proto achieve specific macroscopic states that can be cesses that are very robust to change and very described by low-dimensional order parameters. As flexible in overcoming disturbances. Kelso puts it, in biological self-organization there are There are two aspects to this way of interpreting biological cases of self-organization that are parthat do the actual work. Also, the specific codings ticularly important when this interpretation is also present within the DNA are derived from long-term applied to psychological systems. First, it must be evolutionary selection and in this sense are indepenstressed that ICPs are a part of the microscopy. dent from the short-term ongoing, biomolecular Self-organization implies a distinction between a processes. microscopy and a macroscopy as two different levels
To summarize, bringing self-organization to bear of aggregation and description. The microscopy selfon biological systems thus involves thinking in terms organizes into a macroscopic pattern as described by of and teasing out complex regulatory networks with an order parameter. ICPs are factors that happen to their self-organizing properties. There is 'plain' initiate and maintain particular macroscopic patterns physical self-organization such as in convection and in this sense are closely linked to the macrosrolls. And there is the biological steering of this copy. However, to act as control parameters ICPs self-organization by specific parametric influences in must have an existence prior to and independent the form of ICPs. This self-steering involves a meshfrom the macroscopic patterns they help to bring like system of multiple, parallel and reciprocal about. Without such independence, new instances of influences, involving regulatory and structural genes, a particular biological form could never be generated gene products, and factors deriving from the largein this way. Normal control parameters remain scale build up produced by all this activity. How to outside the range of the microscopy-macroscopy make sense of such a mesh-like organization? This system and are thus by default independent from the brings us back to the question whether the notion of macroscopic order. For example, the heat gradient representation plays a necessary role in this context. that results in convection rolls in a fluid exists independent from these rolls. ICPs, however, must be part of this two-level system, and the only place where they can function as a parameter independent 5 . Non-representational internal states as a from the macroscopy is within the microscopy.
conceptual option for DEC In addition, these internal control parameters must also maintain a certain independence from the micro-
The existence of representation-hungry problems scopic processes to which they belong. When ICPs for cognitive systems is a forceful reason for thinkare to act as a switching device, initiating and ing that it is necessary to combine a dynamic and stopping specific biological self-organizing proembodied view on cognition with representations. cesses, they cannot continuously take part in the How does the discussion on biological self-organizaongoing interactions between the microscopic eletion bear on this claim for the necessity of reprements. Their continuous physical presence within the sentations within DEC? In this final section, I will microscopy must not lead to a continuous specific argue that the biological case shows that it is parametric influence. This influence has to be a possible to envision a long-term steering mechanism variable, sometimes present sometimes not. An ICP for cognition that is not based on the notion of must in this sense be buffered from the microscopy subpersonal representations. Internal states-such as at large, while its parametric influence has to be biological internal control parameters-could guide triggered by some other influence.
short-term organism-environment couplings over All of this corresponds in a general way with longer time scales into specific directions. These current knowledge about the operation of genes in internal states would perform a function that is metabolic processes and morphogenesis. DNA, the equivalent to the one usually performed by reprematerial embodiment of genes, situates the genetic sentations in ordinary cognitive accounts. However, factor firmly within the biomolecular operation of at the same time, these internal states are so different living systems. At the same time DNA remains from the cognitive science's traditional notion of relatively sheltered from the immediate ongoing representation that it is perfectly reasonable to hold biomolecular processes and influences these prothat they are not representations. Thus the seemingly cesses indirectly by coding for particular proteins inescapable connection between representation-hun-gry problems and the invocation of representations regulatory circuits in terms of genetic regulatory within DEC can be cut.
circuits. Rather, it imposes a traditional frame of Before presenting my reasons for thinking that mind onto this kind of organization. As Savageau ICPs are not representations in a cognitive context, I
puts it: ''The common metaphor of the genome as a will give a short sketch how the ICP story falls in blueprint for construction of the organism masks the with a tendency in biology away from a symbolical difficult task of relating structure and function of the 1 interpretation of genes and DNA. Assuming for the intact organism to its underlying genetic determipresent that genes can be cast in the role of ICPs, nants'' (1998, p. 55) . A symbolic interpretation of what message can be drawn from biology concerning genes highlights the genes and their presumed the question whether genes (and in this roundabout phenotypic effects and downplays the contribution of way ICPs) are to be understood as the biological the intermediate network of regulatory processes that equivalent of representations? Since the rise of connects the two. This interpretation can easily genetics in the first half of the twentieth century, the become counterproductive as it obscures the kind of dominant metaphor for the genome has been that of a interaction involved in relating a genome to a whole blueprint that provides all the necessary information organism. Under these circumstances it seems unfor the construction of an organism (Savageau, helpful to see the genome as an instance of a symbol 1998). In this metaphor, the rest of living systems system as we know them from personal-level exbecomes a mere derivative of the genetic inforperience and from computer science. Rather than mation.
seeing the problem as one of filling a gap between However, living in a time that the Human Genome genes and their effects, new concepts and tools seem Project is finished and we have a preliminary list of to be required that deal directly with the complexity all human genetic information stored within our of the complete regulatory networks involved (Bell, DNA, it has also become clearer than ever before 1999; Gibbs, 2001; Kauffman, 1993) . It is exactly in that we hardly have any general understanding how this context that the notion of ICPs and biological genes are supposed to produce their large-scale self-organization become relevant. effects within the human body. There is no uniSo far, this discussion within biology is far from directional flow of control, starting with the genes settled. Nevertheless, for present purposes, it suffices and then outward into the large-scale structures of to point out that here is a context where a seemingly the body. Genes act as components within a complex self-evident interpretation as a symbol system is network of regulatory factors, involving initiation, actively challenged, while new conceptualizations of modulation and feedback loops at and between genetic functioning are sought capable of overcomdifferent levels of organization. Obviously, genes ing the shortcomings of the blueprint idea of genes. remain important here, but they definitely lose their Genes are not necessarily a biological equivalent of larger than life character as the sole controllers of cognitive representations even though their imporliving systems (Keller, 2000) . The challenge now is tance within the genetic regulatory networks is not to decipher the operation of such regulatory networks denied. There is an openendedness to the situation in in which genes partake. which it is unsettled whether genes are to be so How does the old notion or metaphor that genes interpreted or not. The central message here for DEC are a kind of symbols fit in with this challenge?
is that even when it is deemed useful to insert Opinions are divided here. The idea that genes are a internal states like ICPs, this insertion implies in no symbolic description is still widely dispersed. At the way a direct commitment to internal representation. same time, there is an important move away from
The biological case makes it plausible in a general this interpretation (Goodwin, 1994; Keller, 2000;  sense that accepting ICPs does not force a commit Schaffner, 1998) . In this view, a symbolic interpretament to representations. How is the situation in the tion of genes does not help to think about genetic cognitive context? Presupposing a commitment to DEC, does adding ICPs to this framework amount to 1 combining DEC with a representational framework?
For much more thorough discussions of this topic, see, e.g., (Keller, 2000; Schaffner, 1998; Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999) .
Before I will argue that the answer is not necessarily yes but plausibly no, it will prove beneficial to obstacle that has to be overcome in order to produce reiterate which particular kind of representation is at intelligent behavior. In DEC the obstacles are turned stake here. The traditional cognitive science way of into the resources-dynamical organism-environhaving representation at a subpersonal level is by ment couplings-that enable intelligent behavior to casting it as a form of internal modeling. Because arise. ICPs modulate this inherent order-producing some internal states are in an abstract and systematic capacity, but they are not the source of this order. way isomorphic to certain aspects of the external This sets up an essential difference between the ways environment, they act as a model and thus count as in which representations and ICPs acquire their representations. In addition, 'real' representation is cognitive relevance. I take this difference to be dissociated from the uncountable spurious instantiasufficient to claim that an account that deals with tions of isomorphism within the natural world by representation-hungry problems by incorporating inadding the requirement of a user-a cognitive systernal states like ICPs is plausible cast as a nontem-that uses the isomorphic states as a guide for representational account. The seemingly inevitable its behavior. However, despite invoking a user, the combination of DEC with representation can be representationality of model-based representations avoided in this way. does not derive from this use, but from the isoBefore finalizing that last conclusion, it is proper morphism that makes it useful for the user. The user to return to the pronouncement that it is obvious that is here only brought into play to select instantiations ICPs are non-representational. At that point, many of representations proper from an overabundance of people will probably react with something like: potential ones. In this view, representations have ''Even waving that improper use of the word 'obvitheir own prior existence, while the user acts as an ous', I do not see that sufficient reasons have been intermediate between the representation and the given for such a momentous claim as a denial of represented. This is exactly the general intuition that representations!'' My reply to this line of thought lies behind traditional cognitive science with its consists of providing more context which should stress on knowledge and knowledge representation make clear that the present claim is hardly as and the view on motor control and behavior as a momentous as one might think, but nevertheless by-product. Given this particular interpretation of sufficiently important to make an issue out of it. The (modeling-based and subpersonal) representation, do discussion will be centered around two questions. the ICPs of steered self-organization fit into its First, has sufficient proof been given to warrant the mold?
claim that ICPs are non-representational? I argue that I hold that the obvious answer at this point is no. the point made here is only that a non-representationThe material setup that enables internal control al interpretation is possible and plausible, not that a parameters to take over the long-term guiding role of representational one is impossible. It is important to ordinary representations differs significantly from consider where the burden of proof lies in this that of traditional cognitive representations. ICPs do context. The second question falls in with this not have their own independent representational answer: Why would one go to all the trouble of a status. The starting point consists of a set of selfnon-representational interpretation if a representaorganizing processes. ICPs come only into play in a tional one remains an option as well? secondary role as parameters that modulate selfHas sufficient proof been given to warrant a nonorganizing processes. They have no status, leave representational interpretation of ICPs? If the issue alone meaning, outside this context. Their only had not been about representations but a more significance lies in a capacity to influence the selfinnocuous set of concepts, such as batteries and organizing processes in repeatable ways. Compared petrol tanks, I do not think that many eyebrows to a representational account, the whole set up of the would have been raised. Batteries and petrol tanks explanation is reversed. In a representational acare equivalent in the general sense that both can be count, representation forms the kernel of the explaused as a car's energy store. However, that identical nation, the starting place for outward intelligent function is performed in a different way, being based behavior. Anything which happens in between is an on different physical and chemical properties and related to a different kind of car engine. When it tional ICPs. It only claims the possibility of the comes to making sense of the functioning of either latter, not their universality at all relevant, cognitive petrol tanks or batteries in the operation of a car, it is subpersonal levels. Third, the argument targets speobviously a good procedure to make a distinction cifically modeling-based representation, as this is between the two. The argument given above to claim arguably the basic concept behind most of current that ICPs are not representations is closely analogous cognitive science's explanations. The argument can to the one behind the battery and petrol tank be confounded by shifting the concept of representadistinction. There are a number of structural charaction to one of its many other interpretations, but then teristics connected to both concepts and these diit is no longer the cornerstone of current cognitive verge sufficiently to claim a difference between the explanations that is at stake. Fourth, ICPs may turn two, despite the general functional similarities. When out to be representations for other reasons besides the reasoning in the car engine case can be considbeing a particular ICP-even being a modeling-2 ered a straightforward pragmatic decision, why based representation -without interfering with the would the decision be different for the representanon-representational interpretation of ICPs. Their tional case?
potential representationality does not bear on their My guess, for what it is worth, is that the issue operation as an ICP. That operation is strictly formuwhether or not to insert representations in some lated in terms of an influence on a process of cognitive explanations is usually not treated as a self-organization, and only the consequences of that relatively neutral theoretical decision, strictly aimed influence-whether or not it results in anticipatory to improve our understanding of some particular behavior-decide on the appropriateness of an ICP. aspects of cognitive functioning. Representation is Fifth and final, the argument sets up only a conalso an important concept within our current, general ceptual possibility that enables thinking about the view of the mind. Any criticism of its possible empirical investigation of the non-representational usefulness in cognitive science then easily becomes steering of cognitive systems in order to deal with interpreted as an attack on the mind itself, a step representation-hungry problems. A representational towards the reduction or even elimination of mental interpretation of ICPs amounts to the extra claim of a concepts from a mature cognitive science. In the face 'direct', symbolizing connection between an ICP and of such a reduction or elimination, many some aspect of the non-local (distal) environment. A philosophers and scientists would put up a fierce non-representational interpretation of ICPs only battle to try to avoid such a portentous conclusion.
claims their influence on self-organizing processes When seen in this light, a denial of the repreoccurring within a dynamic and embodied cognitive sentationality of ICPs is to be treated with the utmost system, which results in behavior that is oriented suspicion, and only taken into consideration if there toward non-local features of the environment. Emwas no single loophole left to avoid that conclusion.
pirically, it may turn out to be that performing this Seen from this perspective, no doubt one finds the influencing function requires of ICPs that they have claim that ICPs are non-representational is heavily also an additional representational 'shortcut' to the under-defended and not to be accepted.
non-local environment. However, this is an empirical However, this is certainly not a perspective that I issue, it should not be decided on beforehand by can share. As this topic is huge in its own right, I
equating ICPs with representations. will give only a listing of reasons for a more light-
In conclusion, the present discussion about ICPs hearted attitude in the case for a non-representational must be dissociated from the philosophical discusinterpretation of internal states like ICPs. First, the sion about the status of mental concepts in the argument is about subpersonal representation. The natural world. The discussion about ICPs is not discussion does not address the personal-level issues about minds but about subpersonal principles that are of the mind, and there is no denial involved of our at work behind mental phenomena. The presence of own, personal-level use of representations. Second, representations is not a default assumption that must perspective of DEC. The notion of representation be actively disproved. It suffices to note that ICPs acts as a disturbing conceptual attractor that draws and modeling-based representations are different one's thinking into paths that DEC explicitly tries to concepts to dissociate them without much ado.
avoid. To withstand the pull, it is wise to maintain a Reifying representations in the form of ICPs would safe distance. only make representation an arbitrary plastic and empty feel-good concept. Also, while accepting this conceptual distinction, an additional representational R eferences interpretation of ICPs may become empirically necessary in the end, but only if it turns out to be Bechtel, W. (1998) . Representations and cognitive explanations: explanatory useful, and not because we do not allow assessing the dynamicist's challenge in cognitive science.
ourselves to even consider other options.
Cognitive Science, 22, These considerations lead to the answer to the 
